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I. INTRODUCTION: THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
The Supreme Court of the United States is tasked with deciding to grant
or deny a petition for certiorari for over 7,000 cases per year, totaling an average
RIFDVHVSHUZHHNGXULQJWKH&RXUW¶V-week term.1 This volume of cases
submitted to the Court has risen dramatically over the last century. In 1900, the
Court saw 406 cert petitions.2 By 1950, that number grew to 1,195. By 1975, it

1
About the Supreme Court, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/about (last visited
Oct. 9, 2020).
2

Federal
Judicial
Caseloads,
1789–2016,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/supreme-court-caseloads-1880-2015 (last
visited Oct. 11, 2020).
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was nearly 4,000.3 %DVHGRQWKLVWUHQGWRGD\¶VFDVHVFRXOGincrease to as
many as 20,000 by 2070.4 Even with the numbers as they are today, the Supreme
&RXUW ³FDQ UHYLHZ RQO\ D IUDFWLRQ RI WKH ORZHU IHGHUDO DQG VWDWH FRXUW FDVHV
UDLVLQJIHGHUDOTXHVWLRQV´5
However, the effective use of judicial maximalism by appellate courts
may decrease these numbers. A maximalist judge can be described generally as
answering the important questions and rendering broad enough decisions to
provide guidance to lower courts and litigants regarding factually similar, though
not identical, disputes. Minimalism, on the other hand, is a case-by-case
approach that looks only to the specific set of facts before it and crafts a decision
narrowly tailored to those unique facts.6 In some circumstances, a minimalist
path-of-least-resistance may be necessary to avoid unintended consequences that
may follow a broad decision. In other circumstances, this case-by-case approach
leaves questions unanswered and provides more opportunity in the future for
litigation on the same topic, thus burdening lower courts with more litigation
and, in turn, laying the foundation for more disputes to reach WKHKLJKHUFRXUW¶V
doors.7
The hypothesis proposed in this Note is as follows: Minimalism is
appropriate, and even important, in some areas of the law; however, maximalism
is the better approach when other actors outside of the judiciary rely on the
MXGLFLDU\¶VZLVGRPWRFDUU\RXWWKHLUZRUN. For example, when police officers,
health care providers, and other actors outside of the judiciary are involved,
maximalism should be embraced. As such, this Note discusses the effects of
judicial minimalism RU ³PLQLPDOLVP´ and maximalism over topics such as

3

See id.

4

This prediction is based on 50-year intervals starting at 406 cases in 1900, increasing to
1,195 cases in 1950, and a final statistic of approximately 7,000 cases in 2000. Aside from rounding
the 7,852 cases filed in 2000 down to 7,000, this simple model does not take into account the recent
decrease in the number of cert petitions filed after 2006. Therefore, the 20,000-case estimate is
likely on the upper end of the realistic scale.
5
Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4
(2009). Grove¶s solution is maximalism all the time: ³The Court must therefore make the most of
the cases it does hear by issuing broad (maximal) decisions that guide lower courts in the many
cases that it lacks the capacity to review.´Id. This Note¶s solution is maximalism in two particular
contexts: (1) mini-maximalism, which is the use of maximalism after minimalism has run its
course, and (2) when actors outside of the judiciary are involved.
6
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME ix±x (1999) [hereinafter ONE CASE];
see also Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the
Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1952 (2005).
7
Shallow decisions coming from the Court often leave issues undecided and give little to no
underlying explanation for the decision itself. ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 17. Sunstein says the
ultimate shallow decisions rest in the decision to deny certiorari. Id.
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physician-assisted suicide and the new state challenges to Roe v. Wade.8 This
Note shows, through an analysis of cases, that minimalism should only be a
starting point. Eventually, a more definite and broadly applicable answer is
necessary. The switch from minimalism to maximalism can and should occur
ZKHQ WKH FRXUW DOUHDG\ KDV FROOHFWHG ³GDWD´ IURP VWDWHV DQG through other
experimental means.
This Note also takes quick aim at analyzing the effects of the theory on
lower courts and other actors. Maximalism is particularly more appropriate when
actors outside of the judicial process are involved. For example, in its Fourth
Amendment case law, the Supreme Court itself has recognized the importance
of bright-line rules which guide law enforcement officers.9 There are many other
factors that must be considered when a court makes a decision, and minimalism
should only be leaned on when agreement is nearly impossible.
The purpose of this Note is not to argue for or against the validity of the
theory of judicial minimalism, but instead, this Note assumes minimalism is a
valid theory that appellate courts abide by before discussing the repercussions of
those minimalist or maximalist choices. This Note accepts that minimalism may
be appropriate for some areas of the law.10 However, courts cannot always hide
EHKLQGWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQWKDWWKH\³VKRXOGQRWGHFLGHLVVXHVXQQHFHVVDU\Wo the
UHVROXWLRQRIDFDVH´11 For example, maximalist decisions are appropriate and
QHFHVVDU\ZKHQ³RWKHUDFWRUV´UHO\RQWKHMXGLFLDU\¶VZLVGRPWRFDUU\RXWWKHLU
work. Roe v. Wade is just one example. Legislatures, health care professionals,
and women need clear guidance when it comes to abortion options.
This Note has both a descriptive and prescriptive component. Taking
6XQVWHLQ¶VWKHRU\RIMXGLFLDOPLQLPDOLVPDVDQDFFXUDWHGHVFULSWLRQRIMXGLFLDO
behavior in Part II,12 this Note then analyzes when courts should rely on
maximalism in Part III.13 Additionally, Part III of this Note argues that
PD[LPDOLVWGHFLVLRQVDUHDVLPSOHDQVZHUWRWKH&RXUW¶VHYHU-growing caseload.14
This Note also applies this solution and asks whether, in light of the recent
challenges to a seemingly maximalist opinion in Roe v. Wade, another
maximalist decision is necessary to settle the field.15 This Note does not argue
8
9

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).

10

Minimalism is appropriate when a Court is addressing an issue of first impression. See infra
Part III.B. Sunstein suggests minimalism is also appropriate ³when the Court is dealing with a
constitutional issue of high complexity about which many people feel deeply and on which the
nation is divided (on moral or other grounds).´ ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 5.
11
12
13
14
15

Id. at 4.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
Yes, another maximalist decision may be necessary. See infra Section III.C.
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that a maximalist decision intended to resolve a particular issue is meant to be
WUHDWHG DV WKH FRXUW¶V ILQDO VD\ RQ WKDW VXEMHFW. It only argues that taking a
maximalist approach, when necessary, positively affects subsequent case law
and lower courts.
II. BACKGROUND: DEFINING MINIMALISM
Judicial minimalism16 is a phrase unfamiliar to most new law students,
yet most students could probably discuss the concept after completing just one
semester. Most generally, a minimalist judge decides the case before her, as
QDUURZO\ DQG VKDOORZO\ DV SRVVLEOH DQG DYRLGV ³FOHDU UXOHV DQG final
UHVROXWLRQ´17 Minimalists are the detail oriented, quiet observers in the back of
the room, only speaking when necessary.18 Even when they do speak, they
address as little as possible to only resolve the situation at hand.19
The art of saying just enough to justify an outcome, in theory, reduces
the judicial decision-making burden and decreases the likelihood of judicial
error.20 3XWVLPSO\³PLQLPDOLVWGHFLVLRQVDUHIDFW-ERXQGDQGXQGHUWKHRUL]HG´21
When a new, broad, or bright-line rule is necessary in a case, minimalists may
DWWHPSW WR ³OLPLW WKH LPSDFW RI [the] rule by adopting a minimalist approach:
defining the rule narrowly to encompass only the factual circumstances before

16
Professor Cass R. Sunstein, the Robert Walmsley University Professor at Harvard Law
School, coined the phrase judicial minimalism and has written a book and many articles defining
and describing the idea. Biography: Cass R. Sunstein, HARV. L. SCH.,
https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10871/Sunstein (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). For some of his
works, see ONE CASE, supra note 6 and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA
L. REV. 825 (2008) [hereinafter Beyond Minimalism]. But see Grove, supra note 5, at 10 (³I also
want to underscore that the distinction between minimalism and vertical maximalism is a matter
of degree and not of kind. Neither approach to opinion writing can easily be reduced to precise
definition. Instead, both constitute general approaches to decision making.´ (emphasis added).
17
ONE CASE, supra note 6, at ix; see also Grove, supra note 5, at 6 (³Minimalist opinions are
both narrow, in that they resolve only the case at hand, and shallow, in that they decline to offer a
broad theoretical justification for that holding.´ (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations
omitted).
18
See Siegel, supra note 6, at 1954 (³Minimalists µsay no more than necessary,¶ Professor
Sunstein urges, µresolv[ing] the largest issues of the day . . . as narrowly as possible,¶ and requiring
µ[a]bove all . . . procedures that are lawful, proper and fair.¶´) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed,
The Smallest Court in the Land, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2004 (§ 4), at 9).
19
ONE CASE, supra note 6, at ix±x (³A minimalist court settles the case before it, but it leaves
many things undecided . . . . It seeks to decide cases on narrow grounds.´).
20
Id. at 4.
21

Grove, supra note 5, at 6.
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[them]´22 :KHQWKLVRFFXUV³LWOHDYHVRWKHUFRXUWVLQRWKHUFDVHVIUHe to make
their own rules of law.´ 23
A minimalist court can be defined as follows:
It knows that there is much that it does not know; it is intensely
aware of its own limitations. It seeks to decide cases on narrow
grounds. It avoids clear rules and final resolutions. Alert to the
problem of unanticipated consequences, it sees itself as part of a
system of democratic deliberation; it attempts to promote the
democratic ideals of participation, deliberation, and
responsiveness. It allows continued space for democratic
reflection from Congress and the states. It wants to
accommodate new judgments about facts and values. To the
extent that it can, it seeks to provide rulings that can attract
support from people with diverse theoretical commitments.24
In short, ³>P@LQLPDOLVWV FRXQVHO FRXUWV WR D FRXUVH RI SDWLHQFH
PRGHUDWLRQ DQG FRPSURPLVH RQ FRQWHQWLRXV LVVXHV´25 The most distinctive
IHDWXUH RI D PLQLPDOLVW LV KHU SUHIHUHQFH IRU OHDYLQJ ³IXQGDPHQWDO LVVXHV
XQGHFLGHG´26 7R FODULI\ WKH H[WHQW RI 6XQVWHLQ¶V DUJument, he suggests that
³GHFLVLRQVDUHQRWXVXDOO\PLQLPDOLVWRUQRWWKH\DUHPLQLPDOLVWalong certain
dimensions´27
The simplest example of minimalism in the Supreme Court is the denial
of certiorari without comment.28 This act is an assertion²a judgment from the
Court²without an opinion. The assertion is as narrow as it can be. Dissenting
from the denial of certiorari indicates a maximalist Justice.29 Dissenting is
unnecessary, as it is only dicta, and provides an opinion when one is not required.
This simple example exemplifies the differences between minimalists and
maximalists.30

22
23

Id. at 3.
Id.

24

Siegel, supra note 6, at 1954 (quoting ONE CASE, supra note 6, at ix±x).
Tara Smith, Reckless Causation: The Perils of Judicial Minimalism, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 347, 349 (2010).
26
ONE CASE, supra note 6, at x.
25

27

Id. at 19.
Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-Doctrine: An Empirical Assessment of Judicial
Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL¶Y 1045, 1070±71 (2009).
29
Id. at 1071.
28

30

Id.
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It is worth noting that justices that disagree doctrinally can be on the
same side of the minimalist/maximalist divide.31 This means that minimalism
affects the opinion in a case and not the judgment.32 -XGJPHQWV ³DUH WKH
GLVSRVLWLRQV LQ WKH LQGLYLGXDO FDVHV EHIRUH WKH &RXUW´ ZKLOH RSLQLRQV DUH WKH
underlying justification and reasoning for a judgment with an eye on the future.33
It is opinions, and not judgments, that can be affected by minimalism or
maximalism.34 Minimalists are concerned with the scope of an opinion.35
0LQLPDOLVWVVHHN³QDUURZQHVVDQGVKDOORZQHVV´36 in an opinion, to reduce the
subsequent applicability of its determination to a later case.37
Judicial minimalism is not a perfect theory. It is certainly more
appropriate in some cases than in others. Sunstein has outlined five factors that
indicate when minimalism may succeed, and four factors which indicate that
maximalism may be more appropriate. Washington v. Glucksberg38 exemplifies
the effective use of minimalism.
31

See id. at 1076. Justices can be minimalists or maximalists. Id. at 1053. Anderson
distinguishes between minimalism in a constitutional and non-constitutional context. See id. at
1067±68. However, these classifications are not permanent, at times varying based on the type of
case, whether constitutional or non-constitutional, before them. Id. at 1068. Anderson argues that
in non-constitutional cases, ³[t]he difference between judgments and opinions is much smaller.´
Id. at 1088.
The attraction of minimalism to a wide range of justices ³seemingly offers the exact kind of
neutrality that adjudication should offer.´ Smith, supra note 25, at 350. However, this may also
indicate that ³something is amiss.´ Id. at 350 (arguing that minimalism is so broad ³that the core
idea of Minimalism is completely untenable´). Minimalism has not gone without criticism. See,
e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2007); Sheldon
Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Minimalist, 89 GEO. L.J. 2297 (2001); Christopher J.
Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454 (2000); Saikrishna
Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left Wing Law Professors are Wrong for
America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207 (2006).
32
Id. at 1055 (demonstrating how Anderson distinguishes between minimalist judges
outputting ³judgments´ and ³opinions´).
33
Id.
34
35

Id.
See Anderson, supra note 28, at 1075.

36

ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 10.
The author pauses for a moment to note that a similar theory to the theory of judicial
minimalism, an analysis of rules versus standards, may produce the same effects on lower courts.
For a discussion on the rules versus standards theory, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557 (1992). For a discussion on how that theory may
affect judicial minimalism, see Anderson, supra note 28, at 1083 (2009) (suggesting that the rulesstandards analysis is perhaps just a ³special case´ of the minimalism-maximalism analysis). A
justice¶s preferences for rules versus standards may affect the scope of an opinion similarly to how
a minimalist justice would decide scope. Even Sunstein noted the similarity. See ONE CASE, supra
note 6, at 41±42.
37

38

521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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A. Why Judicial Minimalism Makes Sense
6RWKDW¶Vwhat judicial minimalism is, but why should appellate courts
care? Sunstein proffers four reasons why judicial minimalism is needed.39 First,
minimalism is helpful because it welcomes agreement when the Court cannot
reach a consensus.40 7KLVOHDGVWRD³VKDOORZ´RSLQLRQLQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH&RXUW
GRHV³QRWJLYHDGHHSWKHRUHWLFDOJURXQGLQJ´EXWQRQHtheless allows the Court to
issue a decision without the judges coming to an agreement.41 Therefore,
unanimous decisions are often minimalist42 because they provide a judgment
without a helpful opinion. These opinions are often led by phrasing such as
³EDVHGRQWKHIDFWVRIWKLVFDVH´RU³LQRQO\DVPDOOQXPEHURIFDVHV´LQGLFDWLQJ
WKDWWKH&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQVKRXOGQRWEHDSSOLHGWRHYHQVOLJKWO\GLVVLPLODUFDVHVLQ
the future.
Second, minimalism can be used because the Court lacks relevant
information.43 Third, and perhaps most importantly for minimalist justices
concerned with making the right judgment for this case and later cases,
minimalism is appropriate when the Court is unsure of the implications tied to
deciding the case one way or the other.44
Fourth, which is affected by the third factor, the Court may engage in
minimalism because it in good faith believes that democracy is more suited to
decide the issue.45 This minimalist idea allows other branches of government as
well as the American people WRHQJDJHLQ³GHPRFUDWLFGHOLEHUDWLRQ,´ZKLFKFDQ
allow other means of resolution or context for future cases.46 Lastly, the Court
may choose minimalism if a clear rule or wide, deep ruling has the potential to
³IDFHLQWHQVHSROLWLFDORSSRVLWLRQ´47 Despite Alexander +DPLOWRQ¶VODEHOLQJRI
the Supreme Court as the weakest branch, the Supreme Court actually
³H[HUFLVH>V@DQH[WUDRUGLQDU\GHJUHHRIDXWKRULW\RYHURXUVRFLHW\DQGFXOWXUH´48
Thus, extending what Sunstein suggests, deciding a case using a maximalist

39

ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 53±54.

40

Id. at 53. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353
(2006).
41
42
43
44
45
46

ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 18.
Anderson, supra note 28, at 1072.
ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 53.
Id. at 53±54.
Id. at 54.
See id. at 54±55.

47

Id. at 54.
Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court
Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 787 (1999).
48
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approach, rather than a minimalist one, without the support of the people could
KDYHDGYHUVHHIIHFWVRQWKHSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHFRXUW¶VOHJLWLPDF\49
Now that the reasons behind minimalism have been outlined, it is
important to understand situations which indicate to the justices when
minimalism should be used, according to Sunstein. There are four delineated
situations in which the Court might engage in judicial minimalism effectively:
Minimalism becomes more attractive (1) when judges are
proceeding in the midst of (constitutionally relevant) factual or
moral uncertainty and rapidly changing circumstances, (2) when
any solution seems likely to be confounded by future case, (3)
when the need for advance planning does not seem insistent, and
(4) when the preconditions for democratic self-government are
not at stake and democratic goals are likely to be promoted by a
rule-bound judgment. 50
In general, the more complex an issue is and the more people who feel
deeply about a divisive issue, the more likely minimalism will be an effective
path for judges to take.51 Additionally, the states are important actors in the
political system, and minimalism allows room for their deliberation in the
democratic process.52
B. A Minimalist Decision in Effect
One instance that illustrates the effect of minimalist decision making is
when the Supreme Court was presented the question of whether it should
recognize education as a fundamental right. San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez53 is a minimalist decision because it was democracypromoting54 and left room for other actors outside of the judiciary to do the work.
Rodriguez was an equal protection case decided after Brown v. Board of
Education,55 but this time the Court declined to recognize a fundamental right to
education under the Fourteenth Amendment.56 The Court was asked to decide if

49

See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857); ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 59. Though, I do agree with Sunstein that ³[u]sually it
would be much better to have a just outcome, rejected by many people, than an unjust outcome
with which all or most agree.´ Beyond Minimalism, supra note 16, at 841.
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 57.
Id. at 5.
See generally JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS (2018).
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
See ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 24±25.
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
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education was protected under the Constitution.57 At the time of this case, there
was such a disparity between the income of schools that the states sought to solve
the problem themselves, perhaps in light of Brown.58 The disparity among the
funding for several Texas schools was often related to race and was heightened
EHFDXVH³WKHJUHDWHVWHGXFDWLRQDOQHHGVUHFHived the worst (or at least the lowestIXQGHG HGXFDWLRQ´59 The plaintiffs sought to require a more uniform funding
system in the state of Texas under the Equal Protection Clause.60
The Court in Rodriguez could have either decided the case under strict
scrutiny or rational basis.61 Not surprisingly, the Court chose rational basis, the
minimalist choice.62 This allowed the Court to defer to the State if the funding
policy was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.63
While the Federal Government allowed such a minimalist answer, many
states took action on their own to mitigate the problem.64 Rodriguez was different
from other minimalist decisions because the Court chose to allow other routes of
democracy to take flight rather than to take over itself.65 Before Rodriguez was
decided even at the district court, the Texas Legislature unsuccessfully attempted
for two years to reform funding legislation to lessen the problem.66 After
Rodriguez, states were left on their own to create a system that would promote
equity in school funding regimes.67

57

Id. at 33.

58

See SUTTON, supra note 52, at 22±23.
Id. at 23.

59

60
See id. at 22±23. But see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 57 (finding no more than a random
probability that racial minorities were concentrated in lower funded districts).
61

SUTTON, supra note 52, at 24.
ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 26 (³Cautious judges can promote democratic deliberation with
more minimalist strategies, designed to bracket some of the deeper questions but also to ensure
both accountability and reflection. Many minimalist decisions attempt to ensure more in the way
of democracy and more in the way of deliberation.´). As Sutton puts it, ³Rodriguez tolerated the
continuation of a funding system that allowed serious disparities in the quality of the education
children received based solely on the wealth of the community in which their parents happened to
live or could afford to live.´ SUTTON, supra note 52, at 27.
62

63
64

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40.
See id.

65
See ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 27 (³[S]ome decisions are democracy-promoting because
they try to trigger or improve processes of democratic deliberation. Minimalist courts can provide
spurs and prods to promote democratic deliberation itself.´).
66
SUTTON, supra note 52, at 25.
67

Id. at 3.
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In analyzing the unique situation after Rodriguez, it is important to note
that states have the power to create systems of public schools.68 This power
allowed them to draft around or provide further protection for education.69
Additionally, the legislatures were a larger part of the post-Rodriguez movement
than were the lower courts.70 The legislatures experimented with fairer funding
systems for longer than what would have been necessary if the Rodriguez Court
had issued a maximalist decision outlining what was required under the Equal
Protection Clause for fair funding.
Rodriguez showcases the increased workload among lower
governmental entities caused by a minimalist decision. While the state
legislatures were doing more work as a result of Rodriguez, the lower courts also
kept busy.71 These lower level lawsuits focused on the Equal Protection Clause
but also addressed alleged violations of state constitutions.72 As Sixth Circuit
Judge and author Jeffery Sutton TXDQWLILHVLW³URXJKO\IRUW\-five States by now
have faced state-constitutional challenges to their system of funding public
VFKRROV´73 These cases and legislative enactments were largely due to the
&RXUW¶VPLQLPDOLVWGHFLVLRQLQRodriguez, which forced the states to take action.
C. When Minimalism Does Not Make Sense
Sometimes, minimalism is not the means to the end, but maximalism
may be. So, how is a maximalist different from a minimalist? Maximalists seek
to publish opinions that will create strong precedent so judges sitting in lower
courts or on subsequent cases have a guidepost.74 As a result of this, maximalists
tend to have a stronger adherence to stare decisis and more easily allow a
previous decision to encompass the case at hand.75 This is contrasted to
minimalists who seem to have a keen eye for dicta, which may lead to decisions
on a case-by-case basis.76 In some circumstances, maximalism is a more suitable
approach for an appellate court:
[I]t is worthwhile to attempt a broad and deep solution (1) when
judges have considerable confidence in the merits of that

68

In looking at early state constitutions, ³many States amended their constitutions, requiring
the legislature . . . to create a µthorough and efficient¶ system of public schools.´ Id. at 27.
69
See id. at 29.
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

See id. at 37.
See id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 20.
See id.
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solution, (2) when the solution can reduce costly uncertainty for
future courts and litigants, (3) when advance planning is
important, and (4) when a maximalist approach will promote
democratic goals either by creating the preconditions for
democracy or by imposing good incentives on elected officials,
incentives to which they are likely to be responsive.77
$ VLPLODU WKHRU\ WR WKH RQH SUHVHQWHG LQ WKLV 1RWH LV ³YHUWLFDO
maximalism,´ZKLFKHQFRXUDJHVWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWWRUHFRJQL]HLWVSRZHUDQG
use it often.78 Under vertical maximalism, higher courts have a duty to issue rules
that govern lower courts.79 The theory rests on the current structure of the judicial
V\VWHP DQG KRZ WR EHVW SUHVHUYH WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V ³VXSUHPH UROH´80 The
judicial system is a hierarchy under Article III of the Constitution and the
Supremacy Clause.81 The higher up in the hierarchy, the more important broad
decisions become.82 But, it has not always been this way.83
,QLWLDOO\ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW ³KDG WKH FDSDFLW\ WR KHDU HYHU\ DSSHDO
SURSHUO\EURXJKWEHIRUHLW´84 +RZHYHUZLWKHDFKFRXUW¶VLQFUHDVLQJFDVHORDG
this is not the case today.85 The role of an appellate court in a system of vertical
PD[LPDOLVPLVWR³LVVXH>@EURDGGHFLVLRQVWKDWJRYHUQDZLGHUDQJHRIFDVHVLQ
WKH ORZHU FRXUWV´86 As this approach indicates, vertical maximalism is not a
substitute for the democratic process.87 Instead, even maximalist courts can
³defer to the political branches.´88 This allows the Supreme Court to maintain its
role as a guide while maintaining the legitimacy of the democratic process.89

77

ONE CASE, supra note 6, at 57 (emphasis added).

78

Grove, supra note 5, at 3.
Id.

79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 4 (quotations omitted).
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
See supra Part I.

86

Grove, supra note 5, at 3.
Id. (³The Court may, under the approach offered here, issue rulings that require all lower
courts to defer to the political branches (such as when it concludes that economic regulations are
subject to rational basis scrutiny or that courts must defer to an agency¶s reasonable construction
of an ambiguous statute).´ (footnotes omitted).
88
Id. at 1.
87

89

See id. at 4.
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1. Successful Maximalist Decisions
The best maximalist case to date, according to Sunstein,90 comes from
the Warren Court: Brown v. Board of Education.91 Although known as a
landmark case for desegregation, Brown was not the first decision by the Court
addressing the issue. Rather, there were ample historical cases that sufficiently
lead up to Brown³7KHUHZHUHSUHPRQLWRU\WUHPRUVDQGTXDNHVLQGLFDWLQJWKDW
DPDMRUOHJDOTXDNHZDVLPSHQGLQJ´92
Plessy v. Ferguson93 was the first attempt by the Court to address the
issue. The Court upheld a separate but equal standard, an arguably maximalist
decision.94 But even at the time Plessy was decided, Justice John M. Harlan
warned the CRXUWRILWVPLVWDNH³,QP\opinion, the judgment this day rendered
will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal
LQWKH'UHG6FRWW&DVH´95 Plessy was not supported by historical context, so it
failed.96 Following Plessy and leading up to Brown were a series of four
minimalist decisions,97 each leaning further away from Plessy and setting the
stage nicely for Brown.98 These four cases rested in the separate-but-equal
context but began to dissolve racial separation.99

90
91

ONE CASE, supra note 6, at xiii.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).

92

Benjamin H. Kizer, The Impact of Brown v. Board of Education, 2 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 1
(1967).
93

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
By upholding the separate but equal doctrine, the Court espoused a rule of broad application
for all other lower courts to follow. This typifies the maximalist approach.
95
Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
94

96
Chris Edelson, Judging in a Vacuum, or, Once More, Without Feeling: How Justice Scalia’s
Jurisprudential Approach Repeats Errors Made in Plessy v. Ferguson, 45 AKRON L. REV. 513, 520
(2012) (³Plessy suffered from its refus[al] to confront the social meaning of segregation and its
harm to black Americans. . . . In other words, the Plessy Court failed to take relevant social and
historical context into account.´) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
97
Motley identifies four pre-Brown cases, which she calls ³foundations rulings´: Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), and
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). Hon. Constance Baker Motley, The Historical Setting of
Brown and Its Impact on the Supreme Court’s Decision, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 9, 9 (1992). This
note identifies these cases as minimalist because the courts only decided the case before it, and the
cases had weak precedential values.
98

Motley, supra note 97.
See, e.g., McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642 (³We hold that under these circumstances the
Fourteenth Amendment precludes differences in treatment by the state based upon race.´).
99
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Fifty-eight years after Plessy, the historical context had matured100 with
the help of these minimalist decisions, and Brown was rightfully decided. In fact,
just four years after Brown was decided, it was reaffirmed in Cooper v. Aaron.101
As Siegel described Brown and the case¶s historical context, ³the Justices
step[ped] up and forcefully expound[ed] the fundamental law regardless of how
polarizing [the] issue may be.´102 Because the Court boldly and broadly decided
Brown as it did, Brown is a maximalist decision.
Brown was certainly followed by what Kizer calls ³minor legal
quakes,´103 including Brown II.104 Over 2,500 cases have cited Brown since the
Court decided the case in 1954.105 Thirty-one of those cases have received
negative treatment;106 that is approximately 1%. However, Brown is now
accepted as among the most followed Supreme Court decisions to date.
2. Failed Maximalist Decisions
In the context of deciding if a rule or a standard is more appropriate,
Professor Louis Kaplow determined that ³whether a lower decision will
constitute a precedent affects the degree of effort an adjudicator should expend
in giving content to a standard.´107 Taking this idea and applying it to the
minimalist argument, a factor in determining if minimalism is appropriate is the
ease of acceptance among lower courts and litigants. If a maximalist decision is
likely to be followed, then a maximalist approach should be taken. This seems
circular in a sense, but consider cases in the Supreme Court¶s history where
maximalism was not appropriate, yet was used, and the result was not favorable.
Two prime examples of the limits of maximalism are Dred Scott v. Sanford108
and Lochner v. New York.109

100
Motley, supra note 97 (discussing World War II as a ³necessary predicate to ending racial
segregation by state governments´).
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Siegel, supra note 6, at 1953.
Kizer, supra note 92, at 1 (internal quotations omitted).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
According to Westlaw¶s Citing References.
According to Westlaw¶s Negative Treatment.
Kaplow, supra note 37, at 583.
60 U.S. 393 (1857).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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The Dred Scott decision is notoriously one of the worst in the history of
the Supreme Court.110 The 1875 decision denied Scott citizenship and access to
the courts because of his ³African descent.´111 The Court went on, deciding more
than arguably necessary, to hold that the Missouri Compromise was
unconstitutional.112
Dred Scott was decided in the years leading up to the Civil War. Actors
in the historical context of Scott did not agree. The majority of the Court was
compromised of five southern justices.113 Unfortunately, these justices were on
the losing side of history. Hagan argues that two letters effected the outcome of
the Dred Scott case.114 These letters revealed that the President-elect, James
Buchanan, and the Court had discussed the concerns that Dred Scott would soon
raise.115 The first letter, written from an agent of the Court to Buchanan directly,
informed Buchanan that the case was going to be decisive one way or the other.116
Additional letters, coming from both Southerners and Northerners, shed
light on the anxious nature of the people to address this question. In that sense,
the issue was ready to be decided.117 However, not enough actors in the historical
context agreed upon what the outcome should be. Because the Court was urged
to make a decision, it did so at an inappropriate time. The Court should have
maintained its original view118 and avoided deciding the validity of the Missouri
Compromise. The use of maximalism in Scott was so destructive as to require a
constitutional amendment to undo it.119
Lochner is also considered by some to be on the same shameful page of
the Court¶s history as Scott.120 Pre-Lochner, and even for some time after, there
was ³a great outpouring of regulatory legislation by the states and, early on to a
lesser extent, the federal government.´121 States at the time regulated many areas
of the economy including ³health and safety standards and inspections for

110
See, e.g., Horace H. Hagan, The Dred Scott Decision, 15 GEO. L.J. 95, 95 (1927); see also
Jack M. Blakin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 49, 54 (2007).
111
Scott, 60 U.S. at 397.
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 455.
Hagan, supra note 110, at 96.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 96±97.
See, e.g., id. at 98.
Id. at 96.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

120
See, e.g., Ellen Frankel Paul, Freedom of Contract and the “Political Economy” of Lochner
v. New York, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 515, 516 (2005).
121

Id. at 517 (internal citations omitted).
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factories and mines, railroad safety regulations and rate fixing, maximum hours
laws, minimum wage laws, limit on child labor, price fixing for goods and
services, prohibitions on the production of alcoholic beverages, banking and
insurance regulation,´ and many more aspects of daily life in the workforce.122
Regulatory legislation was far from new when Lochner was decided in 1905.123
In 1904, Ernst Freund, an author of treatises often favoring state regulation,
described the environment as a time of expansion, with state government having
more ³incisive powers´ than ever before.124
Lochner, however, does not reflect this expansion. The Court in Lochner
restricted state governments from regulating working hours and supported
freedom of contract for workers and employers.125 The Court rejected the New
York statute as an invalid exercise of police power,126 despite the apparent
expansion of state regulatory power.127 Justice Holmes in his dissent even
pointed out that ³[t]his case is decided upon an economic theory which a large
part of the country does not entertain.´128 Less than 30 years after Lochner, the
Court shifted from its failed maximalist decision in Nebbia v. New York.129 The
Court this time upheld state price regulations based on economic policies.130
Nebbia was not quite the maximalist decision to steer all subsequent state
regulatory cases, but it marked a shift in Supreme Court precedent more toward
the leanings of the public and legislators at the time. The Court subsequently
upheld a regulatory law in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish131 and upheld a similar
law in United States v. Carolene Products,132 solidifying the shift away from
Lochner.
The ultimate maximalist decision in the area of substantive due process
and economic liberties is Williamson v. Lee Optical.133 The Williamson

122

Id. at 518.

123

Id.
Id. (³Ernst Freund, a treatise writer not unfriendly to economic regulation under the states¶
police power, stated: µA vast amount of police legislation is justified on this ground, and the state
is readily conceded more incisive powers than despotic governments would have dared to claim in
former times.¶´) (citing ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS 109 (1904)).
124

125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60 (1905).
Id. at 61.
Paul, supra note 120, at 518.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Id. at 537.
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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³conceivable rational relationship´ test,134 though not a strict test, governs lower
courts in the area of substantive due process and provides a framework for which
subsequent litigation can be assessed and decided in an efficient and hopefully
uniform manner. Under the fourth factor, which Sunstein identifies as an
appropriate situation to use minimalism, the case is only minimalist because it
leaves room for other actors in the democracy. Otherwise, Williamson acts as a
maximalist decision and allows lower courts to apply a clear rule to a range of
situations.
III. ANALYSIS: EFFECTIVE USE OF MAXIMALISM
This Note does not advocate for courts to embrace maximalism all of the
time like Tara Leigh Grove does in her call to action theory²³vertical
maximalism.´ However, maximalism is becoming more necessary to guide
lower courts through their increasing case load.135 First, we must understand the
differing effects of minimalism and maximalism on subsequent case law. When
the Supreme Court issues a minimalist decision, it ³leaves a great deal undecided,
in a way that frees up future decision-makers but also leaves them to some extent
at sea.´136 This is more mud than crystal;137 does a minimalist decision create
more or less work for lower courts? Does it increase or decrease the amount of
subsequent case law on the subject? These answers are explored below and the
following conclusion is reached: maximalism is necessary in two situations.
First, appellate courts should issue maximalism decisions when an area of the
law would benefit from a uniform approach and minimalism has previously been
employed in the area. Second, maximalism is appropriate when there is a need
to look to and rely on guidance from the judiciary.
Put simply, minimalists have an appreciation²and possibly a fear²of
the ³potentially harmful effects of decisions that reach far beyond the case at
hand.´138 On the other hand, maximalists are more confident that deciding a case
based on deeper ground can be the correct and just way to proceed, both now and

134
135

See id. at 491.
See supra Part I.

136

Beyond Minimalism, supra note 16, at 838; see also Grove, supra note 5, at 4 (³When the
current Court instead issues a narrow, fact-bound (minimalist) decision, it leaves a great deal to be
decided by the lower courts in future cases and thereby delegates its supreme law-declaration
function to its judicial inferiors.´).
137
This idea, that ³hard-edged rules´ are like crystals and ³ambiguous rules of decision´ are
more like mud, comes from a law review article concerning property law but seems applicable in
this context also. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577
(1988).
138

Beyond Minimalism, supra note 16, at 827.
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in the future.139 Sunstein puts it this way: ³as judicial confidence grows, perhaps
because of extended experience, the argument for depth grows as well.´140
This Note comes to the conclusion that minimalist decisions create more
work for lower courts and increase the need for subsequent case law. Eventually,
a maximalist decision is warranted if other actors rely on the clear rules from the
judiciary, even if that decision does not stand for centuries to come. Maximalist
decisions are necessary to resolve subsequent legal questions in an efficient
manner, especially when ³other actors´ are involved in the carrying out of a
maximalist decision.141 The laws of the United States do not allow indefiniteness
in criminal statutes,142 so why should the rules be any different when interpreting
statutes and applying the law?
A. Maximalism Is Appropriate When Other Actors Are Implicated
Maximalism is a tool the judiciary can use to more effectively give
power to its opinions and orders. The judiciary is not the weakest branch of the
government.143 Therefore, it should not be afraid to give guidance to those
seeking it. For example, police officers rely on Fourth Amendment case law
during their day-to-day activities; similarly, abortion clinicians and others in the
medical field rely on decisions of the judiciary. In cases that implicate other
actors, the Court must take a maximalist approach and decree a clear rule which
acts as a final resolution to maintain and increase its legitimacy.
Minimalism causes indefinite rules of law. Without guiding principles,
lower courts and other actors relying on clear rules are left to their own devices.
It is unconstitutional in the criminal context for legislatures to enact indefinite
criminal statutes.144 Though this has been interpreted loosely,145 why are we

139
140

See id. at 840.
Id.

141

See infra Section III.A.
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (³The constitutional requirement of
definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that
no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand
to be proscribed.´).
142

143

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) for a contrary analysis.
Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617 ³The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a
criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.´).
145
See, e.g., Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973); see also Robert E. Riggs, Miller v.
California Revisited: An Empirical Note, 1981 BYU L. REV. 247, 257 (1981) (³In cases decided
by the Supreme Court there is no dissent from the proposition that some degree of uncertainty is
constitutionally tolerable.´).
144
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encouraging courts to act minimalistically?146 As previously discussed,
minimalism is appropriately applied in some contexts. However, maximalism
should be encouraged when other actors are frequently applying precedent and
when minimalism has run its course.
Three cases exemplify the importance of going beyond case-by-case
decision making and embracing maximalism when necessary: Miller v.
California,147 California v. Acevedo,148 and Roe v. Wade.149 In all three contexts,
maximalism was intended to settle the law and prevent ³endless litigation´150 in
these areas. The first two cases provide grounds for the effective use of
maximalism through their effect on actors outside of the judiciary. In the third
case, though outside actors are certainly implicated, the grounds for using
maximalism lies in the mini-maximalism reasoning. Timing is what is important
for a maximalist decision that may be needed to settle Roe.
1. Obscenity Law
Movie makers, magazine publishers, artists, and store owners²among
others²are affected by the judiciary¶s decisions in this area of the law. Before
the Miller decision, the Court thought it nearly impossible to create a workable
constitutional standard for obscene materials.151 In 1873, newly enacted
obscenity laws banned ³obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy´152 materials, ³but it

146

See Grove, supra note 5, at 1 (³Many prominent jurists and scholars, including those with
outlooks as diverse as Chief Justice John Roberts and Cass Sunstein, have recently advocated a
³minimalist´ approach to opinion writing at the Supreme Court.´).
147
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
148
149

500 U.S. 565 (1991).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).

150
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 620 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976)).
151
Riggs, supra note 145, at 247. For a full history of obscenity law in American history, see
Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex and the First Amendment: The Long and Winding History of Obscenity
Law, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 134 (2019). Specifically, Justice Brennan expressed his disbelief
in his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton: ³no one definition, no matter how precisely or
narrowly drawn, can possibly suffice for all situations, or carve out fully suppressible expression
from all media without also creating a substantial risk of encroachment upon the guarantees of the
Due Process Clause and the First Amendment.´ 413 U.S. 49, 83±85 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted). Brennan made this statement after writing his majority opinion in
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Before Roth, courts relied on old English obscenity
case law. Riggs, supra note 145, at 248.
152

Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873).
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did not define those terms.´153 In 1913, the standard changed, defining ³obscene´
materials in the eye of the law to mean ³the present critical point in the
compromise between candor and shame at which the community may have
arrived here and now.´154 But this definition was not universal and states began
to experiment to come up with a ³coherent meaning´ for the ³legal concept of
µobscenity.¶´155
When the Supreme Court addressed the issue in 1957 in its decision in
Roth v. United States,156 it held that obscene materials were not protected under
the First Amendment.157 It did, in a maximalist fashion, set forth another standard
for determining what materials were legally considered ³obscene´: the
government can censor such materials ³only if the material, judged as a whole,
appeals primarily to the prurient interest in sex, is patently offensive to
contemporary community standards, and lacks any redeeming social value.´158
Roth changed the direction of obscenity case law.159 But even this approach was
not satisfactory;160 ³The Court¶s inability to articulate a clear definition of
obscenity led to an era of chaos and confusion.´161 Justice Stewart¶s famous
phrase for determining if material is obscene describes the lack of direction well:
³That¶s it, that¶s it. I know it when I see it.´162

153

Stone, supra note 151, at 137. During this time, ³[m]aterial was deemed obscene if it had
even the potential to corrupt an impressionable adolescent.´ Id. Enforcement boiled down to this:
³$ny reference to sex in this era was unlawful.´ Id. at 138.
154
Id. at 138 (citing United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)).
155

Id. For example, ³the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that Theodore Dreiser¶s
acclaimed masterpiece An American Tragedy was obscene because it included a scene in which
the main character visits a house of prostitution and another in which the main character and his
pregnant girlfriend attempt to secure an abortion.´ Id. at 138±39 (citing Commonwealth v. Friede,
171 N.E. 472 (Mass. 1930)).
156
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
157
158

Stone, supra note 151, at 139 (citing Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
Id.

159

³Roth replaced the standard of the most susceptible members of a potential audience with
the standard of the µaverage person, applying contemporary community stands.¶´ Riggs, supra note
145, at 249 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
160
See id. at 250 (³No one regarded this doctrinal anarchy as a satisfactory state of affairs, and
it was ultimately terminated by Miller v. California . . . ´ (internal citation omitted)).
161
Stone, supra note 151, at 140.
162

Id. at 140 (citing BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 239 (1979)); see
also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (³I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see
it . . . ´).
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This era of confusion and lack of guidance ended with Chief Justice
Burger¶s appointment to the Court.163 In 1973, the Court in Miller164 issued new
guidance to determine what constituted obscene materials.165 This new test, the
³utterly without redeeming social value test,´166 allowed materials to be legally
obscene if a court concluded the following:
the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest; that the work depicts or describes sexual
conduct in a patently offensive manner; and that the work, taken
as a whole, lack ³serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.´167
Though obscenity is a rarely litigated issue today,168 Miller was the
maximalist decision that settled the law in this area. Miller, through its five
Justice majority, ³pointed to the need for agreement on a more specific and
concrete definition´ in the area of obscenity law.169 At this point, minimalism
and the strategy of determining obscene materials had run its course. Minimalism
was no longer allowing states to address the problem efficiently. The use of
maximalism in issuing the Miller social value test appropriately defined
obscenity for other actors to sufficiently follow precedent. The Court explicitly
pointed out this intentional issuance of a broad rule. According to the Court in
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,170 Miller ³sought to clarify the constitutional
definition of obscene material subject to regulation by the States.´171 The

163

See Stone, supra note 151, at 141.

164

Miller¶s companion case was Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
Riggs, supra note 145, at 250. The new guideline set forth in Miller is as follows:
(a) whether µthe average person, applying contemporary community
standards¶ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest . . . ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
166
Stone, supra note 151, at 142.
165

167

Id. (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24) (emphasis added).
³[T]he Department of Justice filed fewer than ten adult obscenity prosecutions between
2001 and 2005.´ Id. at 142±43. ³By the early years of [the] twenty-first century, . . . we had for all
practical purposes reached the end of obscenity.´ Id. at 143.
168

169
170
171

Riggs, supra note 145, at 250.
413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973).
Id.
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surprising, and perhaps unintended,172 flexibility of this delineated rule allowed
Miller to stand through shifting societal and cultural values.173
Miller still stands as good law today and continues to protect children
from obscene materials.174 The narrowing of obscenity law comes not from
judicial decision, but from society²and technology²changing.175 Miller
sufficiently withstood these changes showing that maximalism can stand the test
of time. Though Justice Brennan¶s critiques176 are sufficiently noted, the chilling
effect that would have resulted from a minimalist decision instead of Miller
would have only been worse. The Court¶s attempt at a definition of ³obscene´ in
Miller was a better guide to lower courts and other actors than a narrow decision
would have been.
2. The Fourth Amendment
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment implicates actors outside of the
judiciary²namely the police force. The judiciary¶s interpretation of the warrant
requirement, among others, directly effects how police officers carry out their
work. For example, with the invention of new technologies, the Court ultimately
determines what level of privacy a citizen enjoys.177 Justice John M. Harlan II,
in his dissent in United States v. White178 stated that ³[t]he magnitude of the issue
at hand is evidenced not simply by the obvious doctrinal difficulty of weighing
such activity in the Fourth Amendment balance, but also, and more importantly,
by the prevalence of police utilization of this technique.´179 In general, the early

172
Chief Justice Burger wrote the Miller opinion, and he ³loathed pornography.´ Stone, supra
note 151, at 141.
173
Id. at 142 (³[C]ommunity standards soon became more tolerant of what would once have
been regarded as ³patently offensive´ depictions of sex, and the real-world definition of obscenity
shrank down to a small fraction of what had once been thought to be obscene.´).
174

Id. at 143±44.
See id. at 143 (³Compared to the 1950s, when any depiction of sex in books, movies, or
magazines was tightly constrained, we are now inundated with all sorts of sexually explicit
material.´).
175

176
Justice Brennan made his critiques known in his Paris dissent. See Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). His three main critiques are as follows: ³(1) the
lack of fair notice, (2) the chill on protected expression, and (3) stress imposed on the state and
federal judicial machinery.´ Riggs, supra note 145, at 252 (quoting Paris, 413 U.S. at 93).
177
See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (cellphone); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (thermal imaging device); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)
(radio transmitter).
178
401 U.S. 745 (1971).
179

Id. at 770 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court addressed Fourth Amendment concerns on a case-by-case
basis.180
More recently, the Court recognized the problem with this decisionmaking strategy. It recognized in California v. Acevedo181 that unclear rules and
narrow case law ³has led to confusion for law enforcement officers.´182 After this
revelation, the Court in Acevedo overturned the old rule, which ³failed to protect
privacy but also had confused courts and police officers and impeded effective
law enforcement.´183 The Court plainly stated, ³[w]e conclude that it is better to
adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant
requirement for closed containers´ as set forth in a previous Fourth Amendment
case.184 Acevedo presented a seemingly narrow issue,185 yet it marked a ³quantum
change in the Court¶s attitude toward the warrant requirement.´186
Before Acevedo, two cases ³created a somewhat puzzling dichotomy.´187
Sanders came first and held that ³if officers possessed probable cause to search
only a container, they had to seize the container and obtain a warrant to search
it, even if it was located in a vehicle at the time of its seizure.´188 Three years
later, Ross stood for the broader proposition that ³a warrantless vehicle search
on probable cause could extend to any part of the vehicle and to any container
discovered during that search²assuming that the object of the search could be
concealed inside.´189 Thankfully, the Court was aware of the importance of its
role as a guide in the area of Fourth Amendment law.190 Instead of simply
overruling Sanders, Justice Blackmun, through the majority opinion, began
chipping away at the ³cardinal principle´ that warrantless searches are per se

180

See James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the Warrant
Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1992) (³In this area of Fourth Amendment law,
the one constant has been dramatic change.´).
181
500 U.S. 565 (1991).
182
183

Id. at 577.
Id. at 576.

184

Id. at 579.
Tomkovicz, supra note 180, at 1106 (³The only issue actually decided by the Court in
Acevedo was whether a warrant is needed to search when probable cause is focused solely upon a
particular container located within a vehicle.´).
185

186

Id.
Id. at 1109 (referring to Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) and United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982)).
188
Id. at 1109 (citation omitted).
187

189

Id.
See id. at 1111 (³Finally, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the Sanders warrant requirement
unnecessarily impedes effective law enforcement.´ (citation omitted)).
190
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unreasonable.191 Because of the Court¶s own admission192 and the frequency of
Fourth Amendment issues, it is easy to see why appellate courts should favor
maximalist decision-making in this area of the law.
3. Abortion Legislation²A New Maximalist Decision Needed to
Settle Roe?
Healthcare is a third area of the law that implicates ³other actors´ into
the decision-making rubric of courts. In 1973, the Court in Roe v. Wade
recognized ³a women¶s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy´ as
encompassed in the right to privacy in the penumbra of the 14th Amendment²
a seemingly maximalist decision.193 Broadly, the Court held that states could
only prohibit abortion after fetal viability.194 But, the Court did not decide if the
right was absolute, and it did not resolve the question of when life begins. In this
sense, it was minimalistic. Overall, Roe was a maximalist decision because it
expanded the right to privacy and provided a clear test for future courts to rely
on.195 At the time, Roe seemed to ³settle the abortion dispute once and for all.´196
Though Planned Parenthood v. Casey197 later changed the method of evaluating
abortion regulations, Roe¶s core remained intact.198
However, Roe did not go without criticism.199 Justice Ginsberg and
Sunstein were among those who were left unsatisfied by the Court¶s decision.200
The legislatures seem to agree with their evaluation of the case. In the last
decade, ³legislation restricting rights and access to abortion has been introduced
and passed at both state and federal levels at an unprecedented rate.´201

191

Id. at 1112.

192

California v. Avecedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991) (³[I]t is better to adopt one clear-cut rule
to govern automobile searches . . . ´).
193
194

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
Id. at 163.

195

See generally id.
Neal Devins, Rethinking Judicial Minimalism: Abortion Politics, Party Polarization, and
the Consequences of Returning the Constitution to Elected Government, 69 VAND. L. REV. 935,
935 (2016).
196

197
198

505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 845±46.

199

Devins, supra note 196, at 936.
Id. The common criticism of Roe is ³that the decision unnecessarily perpetuated
counterproductive, divisive backlash by seeking to short circuit the political process and mandate
an abortion code generally unacceptable to the nation.´ Id.
200

201
Elise Andaya & Joanna Mishtal, The Erosion of Rights to Abortion Care in the United
States: A Call for a Renewed Anthropological Engagement with the Politics of Abortion, 31 MED.
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 40, 40 (2016).
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Accordingly, over 50% of all U.S. states have imposed some sort of restriction
on abortion.202 Since 1983, states have increasingly enacted abortion restrictions,
from a rate of 14 restrictions per year from 1983±2010 to an average of 57
restrictions per year from 2011±2015.203 In 2007, the Court came out with
another abortion decision upholding the right to an abortion in some cases,
requiring access to some procedures to ³preserve the life and health of the
woman.´204 Yet, as of 2016, 17 states attempted to overcome this by restricting
later-term abortions altogether.205 In 2019 alone, seven states adopted abortion
bans in clear violation of Roe and Casey.206
Roe and Casey (³the abortion cases´) left some questions unanswered.
The Court declined to say when human life begins.207 Because of this minimalist
aspect of the abortion cases¶ opinions, states and other organizations are left on
their own to answer this question.208 For example, an article in Medical
Anthropology Quarterly is a ³call to action´ for anthropologists to research and
enter into the ³debates around gender and personhood.´209 The recent ³antiabortion movements in the majority of U.S. states´210 have also attempted to
define personhood and when life begins.211 Nine states have seemingly violated
the abortion cases and attempted to define a fetus as a person.212 One scholar

202
Id. at 40±41 (Restrictions can include ³one or more of the following: (1) impose restrictions
on abortion providers through the Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws; (2)
mandate wait times, ultrasound viewings, and/or reading of legislator-written scripts about fetal
development prior to receiving an abortion; and (3) reduce the gestational age for legal abortion.´).
203
Rebecca B. Reinhold & Lawrence O. Gostin, State Abortion Restrictions and the New
Supreme Court: Women’s Access to Reproductive Health Services, 322 J. AM. MED. ASS¶N 21, 21
(2019).
204
205

Andaya & Mishtal, supra note 201, at 46.
Id.

206
Reinhold & Gostin, supra note 203 (naming Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio).
207

See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Andaya & Mishtal, supra note 201, at 40. Andaya and Mishtal point out that growing
attention and concern for the effects of medical procedures on the fetus reflect the growing
popularity of ³fetal personhood.´ Id. at 42 (³While not studies of abortion per se, these findings
underscored how scientific and medical processes are deeply implicated in the cultural construction
of fetuses as persons with the rights outside of, and even in opposition to, those of pregnant women.
Assertions about fetal personhood in turn shape the terrain on which arguments about the morality
of abortion are waged, shaping policy and popular attitudes toward pregnancy and termination.´).
208

209
210

Id. at 40±41.
Id. at 41.

211

Reinhold & Gostin, supra note 203.
Id. (³Beyond direct abortion regulations, 9 states extend personhood to previable fetuses,
defining µperson¶ to include an µunborn child.¶´).
212

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol123/iss2/9

24

Cyphers: Maximalist Decision Making: When Maximalism is Appropriate for Ap

MAXIMALIST DECISION MAKING

2020]

635

even praised Casey ³for recalibrating abortion rights´ to align with ³prevailing
views of popular opinion and elected official preferences.´213
So what historical context is necessary in the area of abortion for a
maximalist decision to succeed? Looking to the political context, ³any theory of
constitutional rights moored to an understanding of the political process must
take recent developments into account.´214 Particularly for this discussion, it is
important to realize that ³today¶s political dynamic is far different than the
political dynamic in 1973 (when Roe was decided) or 1992 (when Casey was
decided).´215 Looking beyond the political system, in a study of reproductive
governance, some anthropologists seem to think ³[t]he relationship of abortion
to modernity was not only a question of demography; many state socialist nations
also linked the legalization of abortion to the expansion of women¶s rights.´216
Additional factors include ³constrained national and familiar economies,
women¶s participation in higher education and employment, and changing
gender and kinship norms,´ which fuel ³desires for smaller families that are
achieved through both contraception and abortion.´217
Is the historical context of 2020 ready for a maximalist decision? 218
Probably not.219 Despite attempts, as of 2016, ³movements to legally establish
fetuses as persons from conception have failed in every state where the policy
has been introduced.´220 Even from the public eye, ³polls have revealed a slight
but noticeable decline in support for legal abortion as compared with polls
conducted two decades ago.´221 Suzanna B. Goldberg, a law professor at
Columbia, sees it this way, ³we live in a society that now seems more receptive

213
Devins, supra note 196, at 937; see generally NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL
VALUES (1996).
214
Devins, supra note 196, at 937. Such ³political developments´ in 2016 included ³party
polarization and the related rise of the Tea Party´ among other things. Id.
215
216

Id.
Andaya & Mishtal, supra note 201, at 42.

217

Id. at 42±43.
This Note does not intend to predict the likelihood or potential results of overturning Roe.
For such an article, see for example Kimberly Leonard, What Happens If Roe v. Wade Gets
Overturned?,
WASH.
EXAM¶R
(July
17,
2018),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/healthcare/what-happens-if-roe-v-wade-getsoverturned. See also Reinhold & Gostin, supra note 203.
218

219
But see Devins, supra note 196. Devins argues that reliance on the political process is
misplaced, and the Court is the only actor suitable to settle this dispute. Id. at 936. This Note,
however, disagrees and argues that when political actors implement the Court¶s decisions, it is
necessary to come to more of an agreement before the Court issues a maximalist decision intended
to be the ³be all end all.´
220
Andaya & Mishtal, supra note 201, at 46.
221

Id. at 48.
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to gay rights than women¶s rights generally.´222 The Court ³sidestepped´223
significantly interfering with Roe v. Wade, or issued a minimalist opinion, in a
recent 2019 case.224
If the Supreme Court issues a maximalist decision now, both the Court
and the decision may face criticism. And, the decision is more likely to be
overruled in the future. Though, note that a maximalist decision does not require
overturning the abortion cases. Some scholars actually predict that overturning
is unlikely, and a significant limit on the precedent is much more likely.225
Perhaps Judge Sutton¶s strategy is not a bad one here: wait for the states to figure
it out and determine the best strategy based on that.226 In fact, his criticism of
Roe is that it decided the issue for the entire country while the country was not
yet ready for such a defining maximalist decision.227 The states have yet to come
to a consensus and the consequences are yet to be discovered. Once the dust
settles, then the Supreme Court may be in a better position to issue a maximalist
decision that can act as a guide for subsequent cases and state actions.
Like in Brown, maximalist decisions may be followed by a series of
minimalist clarifications, but the appropriate use of maximalism is likely to
increase the use of stare decisis and less likely to increase overturned decisions.
Applying that reasoning to the current challenges to Roe, it is likely that the Court
will need to eventually use maximalism to clarify, change, or support Roe, but
not yet. That decision will come when the historical context is ready, which may
not be 2020 or even 2021.
B. Mini-Maximalism—The Use of Maximalism After Minimalism
Sunstein identifies what factors determine when judicial minimalism is
appropriate, outlined above. However, it is necessary to identify factors that
determine when a maximalist decision will be effective.228 So, what factors

222
Adam Liptak, Justices’ Rulings Advance Gays; Women Less So, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/us/as-gays-prevail-in-supreme-court-women-seesetbacks.html.
223
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Sidesteps Abortion Question in Ruling on Indiana Law, N.Y.
TIMES (May 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/us/politics/supreme-court-abortionindiana.html.
224
225
226
227

See Box v. Planned Parenthood, 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019).
Reinhold & Gostin, supra note 203.
See generally SUTTON, supra note 52.
Id.

228
An effective maximalist decision provides a clear and just judgment while clarifying the
law for use in subsequent cases. These maximalist decisions will guide lower courts and reduce or
eliminate the need for appeals because agreement precedes an effective maximalist decision.
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should be considered in deciding if a court should use maximalism when issuing
a decision?
To start, a court should consider whether information has been gathered.
A maximalist decision should come after information has been gathered. 229
Minimalism is a starting point. Courts should initially embrace minimalism and
decide cases narrowly until democracy has peaked.230 This means that courts
address issues of first impression minimalistically, then once uniformity is
needed and the consequences of an intended strategy have been revealed,
appellate courts can use their jurisdiction and power to issue maximalist
decisions. The use of ³mini-maximalism´231²the path from deciding an issue on
a case-by-case basis to issuing a broad, guiding decision²could strike the
perfect balance between an increasing caseload and justice in future cases.
Another factor in deciding whether a maximalist path is appropriate is
³the frequency with which the information will be used.´232 When a topic is
highly contested by the public, minimalism will provide a more just result,233 at
the expense of frequent litigation. For example, contention is evident in the area
of abortion law today. Recent attempts by states to enact strict abortion statutes
clearly prohibited by Roe and its successors exemplify the need for perhaps
another maximalist decision in this area of the law.234 It is as simple as this: more
contention, more cases. Therefore, using a maximalist approach is most effective
when public agreement and justice align with the judgment rendered.
Third, the degree of state involvement is a factor in determining if the
time is right for a maximalist decision. As Judge Sutton points out, if states are
particularly interested in an issue, they have the power to enact legislation on the
matter, and if the Supreme Court decides a case against them, then subsequent

229

In an economic evaluation of rules and standards, Kaplow concludes that ³[w]hether a law
should be given content ex ante or ex post involves determining whether information should be
gathered and processed before or after an individual¶V act.´ Kaplow, supra note 37, at 585. This
concept is directly analogous to the minimalist/maximalist debate.
230

The peak of democracy goes something like this: The peak comes when states have been
laboratories and legislatures have experimented with the issue and attempted to address it. After
several states have tried various approaches, and the consequences of those actions are known,
courts can then choose the most effective solution. At this point, issuing minimalist opinions does
nothing. Maximalist decisions would increase uniformity and hopefully compliance. Powers may
be abused less, and oversight becomes possible across borders.
231
Credit to Blake N. Humphrey, 2021 J.D. Candidate at West Virginia University College of
Law, for the nomenclature.
232

Kaplow, supra note 37, at 585.
See Beyond Minimalism, supra note 16, at 841 (arguing that ³[u]sually it would be much
better to have a just outcome, rejected by many people, than an unjust outcome with which all or
most agree´).
233

234

See infra Section III.C.3 for an analysis of this issue.
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case law in the lower courts can increase in number.235 State-specific legislation
results, and national unity is decreased. Therefore, a consideration in determining
whether a court should use minimalism or maximalism to render an opinion
should encompass the idea that states can ³serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.´236 If
state action is preferred, courts should choose minimalism. After states have
tested a system or theory, then the Supreme Court may adopt a similar approach.
This allows the Court to render an opinion while already knowing the risks and
advantages from seeing them play out in the different states.237 Such opinions
should reduce fear of the unknown for minimalists and also please maximalists
by allowing for a clear rule that provides guidance to lower courts. On the other
hand, if a more uniform approach is needed or if a judgment is clearly favored,
maximalism is the answer.
1. Recent Title VII Decisions
The recent cases of Bostock v. Clayton County238 and Our Lady of
Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru239 provide great examples of the need for
mini-maximalism. First, Bostock lends itself to future litigation and is not the
maximalist decision to settle all case law in this area. The Court even said that
itself. On the other hand, Morrissey-Berru might not have been needed if its
predecessor case had been more clearly defined. Each case is addressed in turn.
Bostock stems from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
protects employees from discrimination based on their sex.240 In this
consolidated case,241 Gerald Bostock worked as a child welfare services
coordinator in Georgia.242 While working there, Gerald started playing in a gay
recreational softball league.243 After his employer discovered this hobby,
Gerald¶s employment was terminated for conduct ³unbecoming´ of its

235

SUTTON, supra note 52, at 2.

236

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See generally SUTTON, supra note 52.

237
238
239

140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).

240

41 U.S.C.A § 2000(e) (West 2020).
Gerald Bostock¶s case out of the Eleventh Circuit was consolidated with its Second Circuit
counterpart, Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda, 883 F.3d 100 (2018). The case of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2017),
was also covered by the Court¶s decision in Bostock.
242
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
241

243

Id.
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employees.244 Bostock filed a discrimination suit against his employer soon after
his termination. Both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit agreed that Title
VII does not support a cause of action for discrimination based on sexual
orientation.245 The issue was then presented to the Supreme Court of the United
States; does the word ³sex´ in Title VII include sexual orientation and/or gender
identity?246
The Court answered in the affirmative, seemingly expanding the reach
of Title VII. The Court had previously addressed what was covered under the
term ³sex´ in Title VII in a series of three cases.247 In these minimalist cases, the
court decided that each narrow scenario individually fell under the protection of
Title VII. Bostock uses and expands these minimalist decisions and is more
encompassing. The Court acted on its own in expanding the reach of Title VII
and did not wait for the legislature to explicitly write ³sexual orientation´ into
Title VII. However, Bostock is not quite a maximalist decision that will prevent
subsequent litigation. The following excerpt from the Court¶s opinion addresses
this ³concern´:
The employers worry that our decision will sweep beyond Title
VII to other federal or state laws that prohibit sex discrimination.
And, under Title VII itself, they say sex-segregated bathrooms,
locker rooms, and dress codes will prove unsustainable after our
decision today. But none of these other laws are before us; we
have not had the benefit of adversarial testing about the meaning
of their terms, and we do not prejudge any such question
today . . . . Whether other policies and practices might or might
not qualify as unlawful discrimination or find justifications
under the provisions of Title VII are questions for future cases,
not these.248
Employers were obviously concerned about the reach of this decision,
but the Court expressly limited the reach of its decision. Still, Bostock is more
than a minimalist decision; it is a step toward maximalism. Considering the
factors above, perhaps the Court felt comfortable deciding Bostock more broadly
than the previous trio of cases because, since Title VII¶s passage, states have

244
245

Id. at 1738.
Id. at 1754.

246

Id. at 1739.
See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (extending
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), and including same-sex sexual harassment
under Title VII); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (including gender stereotyping
as a form of unlawful discrimination); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)
(encompassing sexual harassment under Title VII).
247

248

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753.
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provided protections of their own to the LGBTQ+ Community.249 States such as
California,250 Maryland,251 and Wisconsin252 have explicitly written ³sexual
orientation´ into their state codes, effectively protecting the class from
workplace discrimination.
Bostock seems like a bold, bright-line rule. These state laboratories have
given the Supreme Court the opportunity to see the consequences of including
sexual orientation as a protected class; information was gathered before the Court
expanded protection. The creation and enactment of state legislation also
represents the high level of interest in this topic. Whether intended or not,
Bostock increased national unity and exemplifies the use of and need for minimaximalism. The trio of cases preceding Bostock were minimalist decisions
which laid the foundation for the Court to issue broader decisions. Though
Bostock is not the maximalist decision to end all future litigation, it is a first step
to increasing the reach of case law to decrease future case load.
As another example of the need for maximalism, Morrissey-Berru,
might not have been needed if its predecessor case had been more clearly
defined. Morrissey-Berru concerns the ministerial exception to federal antidiscrimination laws.253 This was not the first case to address this exception,
though. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission254 first recognized an exception for
ministers, preventing religious institutions from being subjected to antidiscrimination laws when hiring ministers.255 The Court in Hosanna-Tabor
familiarly limited the scope of its decision and was explicitly reluctant ³to adopt
a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.´256
Because the Court chose minimalism in 2012, it had to interpret who qualifies as
a minister in its 2020 Morrissey-Berru decision. The Court in this later decision
ultimately followed and expanded its approach in Hosanna-Tabor by granting
the Our Lady Guadalupe School an exception to anti-discrimination laws,
classifying Agnes Deirdre Morrissey-Berru as a minister.257 Once enough
minimalist decisions build to create enough case law to provide a just result in

249
By 2019, 21 states had included LGBT employees as a protected class for employees.
Katherine Carter, Questioning the Definition of “Sex” in Title VII: Bostock v. Clayton County,
GA, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL¶Y SIDEBAR 59, 59 (2020).
250
CAL. GOV¶T CODE § 12940 (West 2020).
251
252
253
254
255
256
257

MD. CODE ANN. § 20-601(h) (West 2020).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.36 (West 2020).
140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
Id.
Id. at 190.
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2066.
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all similar cases, a maximalist decision simplifies and decreases appellate courts¶
caseloads.
C. The Numbers
In general, the number of cases commenced in federal trial courts in the
United States has steadily increased since the early 1900s.258 Even as late as
1970, the number of private suits commenced in federal district courts registered
well below 100,000 cases; in fact, only 62,356 cases were reported.259 There was
a rapid increase in the next 15 years with the caseload almost doubling; in 1985,
156,182 private suits were commenced in federal district courts in the United
States.260 Another 15 years passed, and in 2000, an even higher 188,408
commenced cases were reported.261 In the latest 15-year interval, 237,453 cases
were reported in 2015.262
Why are these numbers important? If these numbers continue to
increase, courts will need a different approach to effectively deal with the
increasing number of cases. At the trial court level, these numbers could be
affected by new technology or the increasing population. Such problems creating
litigation often cannot be solved in advance. Courts can, however, implement
maximalist decision making to minimize the number of cases that could be
solved by previous decisions of the court.
If uncertainty is left unresolved at the appellate level, lower courts are
left without guidance, only having narrow and shallow precedent which can
hardly be classified as binding. Case-by-case decision making does nothing to
help the next court and the next case down the line. Minimalists are concerned
about the costs of error, but their actions drive up the cost of making future
decisions. Trial courts alone cannot set binding precedent, which is needed for
an effective maximalist decision to decrease the number of subsequent cases
dealing with a particular matter. Thus, appellate courts must be involved.
The statistics from United States Courts of Appeals are even more
interesting. From its origins in the late 1800s until the 1960s, the caseload of the
courts of appeals steadily increased.263 From the 1960s until the mid-2000s, there
was a rapid increase in cases commenced in federal courts of appeals.264 In 2005,
258

Trial
Court
Caseloads
Since
1870,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/trial-court-caseloads-1870 (last visited Oct.
9, 2020).
259
Id.
260
261
262
263
264

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the number of cases commenced peaked at 68,472²up more than 17 times from
the 3,899 cases commenced in 1960.265 If this number continues to increase as
the trend indicates,266 a solution is necessary. That solution is properly implicated
judicial maximalism.
Maximalism is not appropriate when courts are addressing issues of first
impression. But maximalism is especially appropriate in areas of the law in
which other actors rely on the judiciary to output clear, helpful guidelines which
must be followed. When justices output judgments with a very shallow opinion,
those opinions do not set broadly applicable precedent. This creates more work
for lower courts because shallow opinions do not decide the next constitutional
challenge within the same subject. The lack of case law that applies across a
subject impedes a timely resolution of subsequent cases and further slows the
wheels of justice. A maximalist decision allows progression among a subject and
efficiency among lower courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
In some cases, minimalism is a starting point. But eventually, an answer
with some finality is necessary. That answer comes in the form of a maximalist
decision. A maximalist decision clarifies existing case law, while preventing the
need for further case law on the topic at hand. In other cases, maximalism is
called for to clarify and broadly interpret the law so that other actors outside the
judiciary can appropriately abide by it. While not all challenges can be prevented
or even foreseen, maximalism may help address the growing number of suits
commenced in United States federal courts. The scope of a decision can increase
or decrease the number of subsequent cases. Maximalists take the better
approach when it comes to the scope of an opinion. Minimalists focus so much
on narrowing the scope that future case law suffers.
There are certainly exceptions to this rule. Maximalism in some cases
may create more of a need to overturn case law when the historical climate
changes, though maximalists do generally adhere more strongly to stare decisis
than do case-by-case minimalists. Minimalism provides a less specific but
perhaps better suited answer to individual, ³quirky´ legal questions. Yet,
maximalism provides more transparency and more guidance to lower courts on
subsequent cases within the realm of the maximalist decision, thus decreasing
the need for appeals and potentially even the number of cases filed by providing
clearer guidance to the public. In advocating for maximalism, it is important to

265

Id.
Id. Though, after its peak in 2005, the caseload of courts of appeals has appeared to decrease.
This Note assumes that the peak may be followed by a short decrease but will eventually continue
the exponential climb toward a steadily increasing caseload²following the long-term trend rather
than the short-term.
266
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remember Anderson¶s distinction267 that minimalism, or maximalism, ideally
only affects opinions and not judgments. Therefore, the outcome remains the
same in each individual case, but the process becomes more efficient with the
use of a correctly timed maximalist decision.
Lauren Cyphers*

267

See supra Part II.

*
J.D. Candidate, West Virginia University College of Law, 2021; Bachelor of Science in
Mathematics, West Virginia University Eberly College of Arts and Sciences, 2018; Executive
Editor, Volume 123 of the West Virginia Law Review. The Author would like to thank her peers
on the West Virginia Law Review for their very hard work on this Article and on each Issue of
Volume 123. $Q\HUURUVFRQWDLQHGKHUHLQDUHWKH$XWKRU¶VDORQH

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2020

33

